

## TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE

2 Dec 61

TO:

James P. Wade, ASD/PDUSDR&amp;E

ROOM NO.

2E1014

BUILDING

Pentagon

REMARKS:

As promised.

FROM:

Harry Rowen, Chairman/NIC

ROOM NO.

7E62

BUILDING

Hqs./CIA

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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NFAC 5812-91/1

## NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

81-2 272/1

Director

7 OCT 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Soviet Science and Technology Collection

REFERENCE: Memorandum, Same Subject, dated 14 September 1981

1. Action Requested: Your approval of the recommendation below.
2. Background: Your memorandum of 14 September requests a community-wide assessment of the Soviet S&T clandestine acquisition effort, with a view of making senior officials of the U.S. government aware of the scope and magnitude of that effort and its implications for U.S. East-West technology transfer policy. The Deputy Director for Operations, CIA, Chairman, National Intelligence Council, and I all agree that the Soviet clandestine acquisition activity is a very serious matter and that an informative paper on this issue is badly needed.
3. Considerable work on this subject is already underway:
  - ° NFAC is preparing a summary report on the Intelligence Community's role in the technology transfer area for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence;



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- ° The IC Staff's annual report to the NSC on Hostile Intelligence Services' Multidisciplinary Threat and U.S. Countermeasures includes an examination of the U.S. technology target, which provides a useful input to the proposed assessment.

4. In addition to helping coordinate the Community's assessment of the nature and extent of the Soviet intelligence threat, the conduct of this assessment on a Community-wide basis should greatly facilitate the development of a coordinated approach to countering that threat both in the United States and abroad. You should be aware, however, that such a Community-wide project--mainly because of the time required for self-education of the working group and Community coordination--would probably take six months at a minimum from the time of initiation.

5. Recommendation: That the new CIA's Technology Transfer Assessment Center take the lead in producing the Community assessment of the role of Soviet and Bloc Intelligence Services in the acquisition of U.S. and western technology. In our view, the Center is probably better positioned to undertake the study you have asked for than would be the formal Community estimative machinery. The Chief of the Center, [redacted] would in this instance, function in a Community role--as [redacted] regularly does in the nuclear proliferation field--and an Intelligence Community report could then be put out under the aegis of the National Intelligence Council. The DDO and C/NIC concur with this recommendation.

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LAWRENCE J. HARRISON

John McMahon

/s/ William H. Casey

APPROVED:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Director of Central Intelligence

DATE:

20 OCT 1981

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SUBJECT: Soviet Science and Technology Collection

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NFAC/OSWR/TTAC [redacted] (2 Oct 81)

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